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Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A
Case Study on Unemployment
Compensation Benefits and the Male
Norm
by
DEBORAH MARANVILLE*
Introduction
Attorneys often view academic perspectives on law as excessively
"theoretical"-discounting legal theory as abstract and irrelevant to the
practice of law. Certainly, theory can be abstract and irrelevant, but in
some measure this resistance to theory derives from an unnecessarily lim-
ited understanding of the "theoretical." That limited understanding is
encouraged by an academic focus on doctrine, that is, abstract legal rules
divorced both from the context.of how they are used by attorneys and
how they work-or don't work-in practice, and also from any but the
most superficial explanations for those rules based on history, philoso-
phy, economics, anthropology, or other academic disciplines.
The following case study analyzes an aspect of the theory-practice
relationship as it played out in one case, suggesting that, when broadly
understood, theory is both critical to and inevitably intertwined with the
representation of clients in law practice.
I. Theory/Practice Relationships: Feminist Theory and Legal
Change
A broad view of legal theory is that it encompasses any effort to
think about, struggle with, and shed light on the intractable problems of
* Lecturer and Supervising Attorney, University of Washington School of Law, Civil
Law Clinic. B.A. 1972, Stanford University; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School.
The analysis developed in this case study was generated in litigation on behalf of Ms. H
undertaken by the University of Washington Civil Law Clinic, for which I was the supervising
attorney. Although the litigation was resolved on other grounds, the substantive law issue is
likely to recur. Thanks to Doug Barrett, Karen Charvet, Rob Lopez, and Nona Skumanich
for their work in representing Ms. H; and to Janet Ainsworth, Jane Ellis and Rachel Paschel
for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this case study.
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our time. A doctrinal approach, by contrast, operates in a middle level
of abstraction, neither practical nor truly theoretical, in the sense of at-
tempting to provide explanations or insight into the multiplicity of lives
that we lead.1
At the most basic level, theory can refer to any attempt to generalize
from experience. In this sense, the process of linking language to events
virtually always can be described as one implicating theory.2 Even three-
year-olds engage in theory as they attempt to learn about the world, 3 and
all attorneys engage in theory, however unreflective or unsophisticated.
At a second level, we engage in theory when we attempt to critique or
challenge those initial generalizations and assumptions.4 A third, and in
some academic circles dominant, view is that theory consists of detached
and objective explanations for the world-generalizations from which we
deduce the appropriate response in particular cases.5
The concept of legal practice is equally complex, including activities
ranging from interacting with clients and legal institutions to developing
legal strategies and arguments. Thus, theories about legal practice can be
directed at understanding the ways in which acting the role of the lawyer
restricts the lawyer's freedom in relating to both clients and legal institu-
tions, 6 the effects on the lawyer-client relationship of different approaches
1. I claim no originality for this analysis, having heard it as a law student from Duncan
Kennedy.
2. The recent literature on the role of metaphor in language illustrates how the use of a
particular category to name experience has major implications for the way we understand that
experience. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980);
GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL
ABouT THE MIND (1987). My two favorite examples are the contention that our understand-
ing of argument is structured by the Argument is War metaphor and the contention that
problems are more profitably viewed as Chemical solutions than as Puzzles. LAKOrr & JOHN-
SON, supra at 61-65, 143-45.
3. At the Theoretics of Practice conference, Bob Dinerstein told a story that illustrates
this point wonderfully. Bob told us that he is a coffee drinker; his wife drinks tea. After a
dinner party attended by two family friends, a male/female couple, Bob's three-year-old son
asked, "Daddy, is Leslie a man or a woman?" Somewhat surprised by the question, Bob said,
"She's a woman." "Is she a special kind of woman?" asked Bob's son dubiously. Finally, Bob
said "Why do you ask?" to which little Michael replied "But she drinks coffee after dinner...
whenever you and mommie finish dinner you always have coffee and mommie always has tea."
4. I take this to be the view of theory articulated by Phyllis Goldfarb in her article, A
Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1599 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987), reprinted in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) critiqued in Steven L. Win-
ter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-
Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992) (exploring the long-term nature of a style of
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to lawyering skills, 7 the implications of gender differences for lawyering, 8
and the ways in which new legal arguments can be developed with the
assistance of critical social theories that change our understanding of the
world.9
The difficulty in sorting out the different meanings of the terms the-
ory and practice helps explain why calls to integrate theory and practice
are often accompanied by expressions of concern that theory should not
become too remote from practice. To the extent that theory implies
Grand Theory deductively applied, or even abstract doctrine deductively
applied, such theory often seems impervious to correction by reference to
reality. Even efforts made at the second level of theory to challenge our
underlying assumptions become ossified and pejoratively "theoretical,"
unless we treat our generalizations merely as working hypotheses and
constantly revisit seemingly settled issues as the world changes around
US.
This case study addresses but one of the many intersections between
theory and practice: the way in which a legal practitioner can recognize
the potential for new legal arguments through a familiarity with feminist
theory's insights concerning the gendered effects of our legal institutions.
lawyering that empowers clients, and the institutional and ethical limits which hamper imple-
mentation of such a practice); Dianne L. Martin, Organizing for Change: A Community Law
Response to Police Misconduct, Presentation at Theoretics of Practice Conference (Feb. 1,
1992) (tape on file with the Hastings Law Journal) (arguing for collaborative community initia-
tive to combat the problem of police racism and sexism in Toronto); Nancy Polikoff, Am I My
Client: A Lesbian Activist Lawyer Represents Gay and Lesbian Activists, Presentation at
Theoretics of Practice Conference (Jan. 31, 1992) (tape on file with the Hastings Law Journal)
(exploring role definition issues that arise when a lawyer who identifies as part of a movement
represents others in that movement).
7. See, eg., Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992)
(arguing that the positive judgment latent in empathy may be used more effectively by lawyers
to express approval of client feelings).
8. Naomi Calm, Styles of Lawyering, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (1992) (exploring issues
concerning the identification of male and female styles of lawyering); Ann Shalleck, The Femi-
nist Transformation of Lawyering: A Response to Naomi Cahn, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1071 (1992)
(arguing that feminist transformation of lawyering must be based on contextual reform rather
than stylistic change).
9. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Repre-
sentation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992) (arguing for refiguring of the role of the "bad
mother" from object to subject within family law and other practices); Margaret Russell, En-
tering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory
and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992) (discussing deconstruction of institutional practices
that foster division between roles and resistance to "boundary-drawing" which discourages
empathy and coalition); cf Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Per-
spective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992) (arguing that concrete clinical
experience can usefully change the perspectives of social theory); Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-
Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992) (stressing the dangers of imposing on pov-
erty law practice theoretical insights that are not grounded in the concrete).
The case studied here is by no means unique. Rather, it provides an
"everyday" illustration of a process that underlies a wide range of legal
change during recent decades. That process reflects a constant interac-
tion between feminist theory and legal practice.
The feminist movement was founded on consciousness raising-an
attempt to move from concrete personal experience to broader theoreti-
cal insights into the political implications of everyday experience.10 Be-
cause of that foundation, many feminists contest the validity of the
dichotomies that traditionally characterize Western thought,11 including
the dichotomy between theory and practice. 12 Not surprisingly, there-
fore, many leading feminist theoreticians also have been actively involved
in feminist legal practice-whether developing strategies for new legal
claims,1 3 writing amicus briefs, 14 or representing individual women.
Sustained theoretical attention to questions of gender, as well as the
legal response to difference generally, has accompanied the increase in
women entering legal academia during the past decade and a half.15 A
10. Catharine MacKinnon describes consciousness raising as the epistemological under-
pinning of feminist method. CATHARINE A. MAcK INNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE 83-87 (1989) [hereinafter MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY]; see
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829 (1990); Goldfarb,
supra note 4, at 1599.
11. On the role of dichotomies in Western thought, see ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1977). Frances Olsen analyzes three feminist options for challenging these
dichotomies in Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective, 18 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 199 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 4, 1601 & nn.3, 6.
13. Catharine MacKinnon is widely credited for developing sexual harassment as a legal
concept. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979). More recently, she codrafted an ordinance enacted in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Indian-
apolis, Indiana, and Bellingham, Washington that provides civil remedies for victims of por-
nography. Elizabeth Schneider played a leading role in developing the "battered woman
syndrome" defense in criminal cases. See also Ruth Colker, The Practice/Theory Dilemma:
Personal Reflections on the Louisiana Abortion Case, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1195 (1992), for an
account of using the alternative legal strategy of equal protection arguments in abortion cases.
14. For example, Christine Littleton helped draft the BriefAmicus Curiae for the Coali-
tion for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 274 (1987). Catharine MacKinnon wrote briefs defending the Indian-
apolis pornography civil rights ordinance, American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325
(7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1001, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1332 (1986); Sylvia Law co-au-
thored a Seventh Circuit amicus brief opposing the ordinance, BriefAmicus Curiae of Feminist
Censorship Task Force et al., Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 323. Martha Minow co-authored a
Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of a number of groups, including the American Jewish
Congress, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Webster brief
has been widely cited for its use of narratives from multiple perspectives.
15. A small sample of the growing literature includes: MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY, supra note 10; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIS-
COURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
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new generation of theorists has struggled with the inadequacies of equal
protection and discrimination analysis, traditionally premised on the
norm of formal equality, 16 to recognize or remedy the real inequalities in
women's lives. 17 At the same time practitioners have fought for legal
change in such areas as fetal protection polices, maternity or parental
leave policies, sexual harassment, the legal response to pornography, and
the battered woman syndrome defense.
The unemployment compensation case of Ms. H, handled by interns
at the University of Washington Law School's Civil Law Clinic, 18 pro-
vides a classic illustration of this theory/practice interaction. Feminist
theory's efforts to name or rename the social world helped Ms. H's repre-
sentatives transform their understanding of social life and develop legal
theories based on that new understanding.
In Ms. H's case, the Clinic challenged a policy of the Employment
Security Department that limited benefits to individuals seeking full-time
work (the "full-time work rule"). The Clinic built its legal strategy on
two key insights of feminist jurisprudence. The first is that our current
legal system often affects women differently, and less favorably, than
men, and especially disadvantages the majority of women whose lives are
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990); Henna Hill Kay, Models of Equality,
1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39; Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955 (1984); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv.
1279 (1987); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989); Wendy
W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment De-
bate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
16. Discussions of equality typically contrast formal equality and substantive equality.
Under a regime of formal equality, often misleadingly named equal opportunity, all individuals
are subjected to the same laws, even though the laws may affect them differently. The classic
example comes from Anatole France: "[T]he majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich
and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread .... "
THE RED LILY, cited in EUGENE C. GERHART, QUOTE IT II: A DICTIONARY OF MEMORA-
BLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS 224-25 (1989). Substantive equality, by contrast, is concerned with
equality of result.
17. See, eg., Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Secur-
ity, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264,
276 (1989) (structural discrimination in the social security system results in "less effective old-
age financial security to typical women than to typical men"); Mary E. Becker, Prince Charm-
ing: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (arguing that general standards of formal
equality disadvantage women); sources cited infra at notes 34-40.
18. The University of Washington Civil Law Clinic is a law school-based program in
which students have an opportunity to represent clients as part of a law school course. The
students have primary responsibility for cases, while working in teams of two under the super-
vision of experienced attorneys. The Clinic handles about thirty unemployment compensation
hearings a year on referral from the Unemployment Law Project, a small nonprofit agency in
Seattle that specializes exclusively in such cases.
significantly affected by their roles as mothers. 19 This understanding al-
lowed us to question whether the full-time work rule had a differential
impact on women and thus to identify a potential challenge to that rule.
The second insight is that the disfavored situation of women often
results because laws implicitly have been structured to fit male life pat-
terns-male norms20 that are not stated as such, but are instead mistaken
for the inevitable, natural state of being.21 This insight provided a basis
for contending that because the existing interpretation of the statute was
based on such a male norm, a more inclusive understanding of work pat-
terns could lead to an interpretation of the statute that accommodated
both women's and men's experience.
II. The Washington Unemployment Compensation System and
the Worklife of Women
As currently interpreted by the Washington Employment Security
Department, the unemployment compensation system is structured to fit
a worklife more typical of male than female workers.22 In that typical
worklife, a worker is employed full-time, without breaks except for peri-
ods of involuntary unemployment, needs the pay that accompanies full-
time employment, and has no domestic responsibilities that limit the
worker's availability for all shifts. In contrast, Ms. H, along with a sig-
nificant portion of American women today, faces a quite different reality.
Because the daily realities of adult work lives remain heavily gendered,
19. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory. A Way Out of the Ma-
ternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1118-22 (1986); Mary Joe Frug,
Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L.
REv. 55, 57 (1979); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy,
131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249, 1325-28 (1983) [hereinafter Law, Women, Work; Welfare].
20. A central contention of feminist theory is that males are taken as the cultural norm
around which the world revolves. Thus, work equipment ranging from jet cockpits to tele-
phone pole climbing equipment have been sized to fit the typical male body; acceptable work
behavior fits traditionally male expectations-for instance, while aggressiveness may be accept-
able on the job, tears most certainly are not; and the possibility that workers might have child-
care obligations is ignored in developing expectations about availability for work. See
generally Frug, supra note 19, at 57 (discussing how women are handicapped by the structure
of the labor market); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State."
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638 (1983); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1377 (1986) (arguing that the "abstract
universality" approach underlying Supreme Court decisions reflects a male norm because it
cannot account for difference).
21. See MINOW, supra note 15, at 70-74.
22. The lessons of the debate over "essentialism" among feminist theorists impel me to
recognize that this typical worker does not always fit the worklife of all men, though as a
group men fare much better than women. Cf. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL VO-
MAN (1988).
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many women are significantly disadvantaged by the structure of the
Washington unemployment compensation laws.
The following sections describe in more detail the structure of the
Washington unemployment compensation statutes, the responsibilities
faced by Ms. H, and the impact of the statutory scheme on Ms. H and
the many women (and some men) with similar work and family lives.
A. The Washington Unemployment Compensation Scheme
A claimant seeking unemployment benefits in Washington must
meet a series of requirements. First, the individual must have worked at
a job covered by the unemployment insurance system for the equivalent
of seventeen weeks of full-time work during the fifteen months before
becoming unemployed and applying for benefits. 23 Second, the claimant
must be unemployed in accordance with the statutory definition. 24
Third, the person must meet a series of basic eligibility conditions, in-
cluding being "able to work, and.., available for work in any... occu-
pation... for which he or she is reasonably fitted," which means "ready,
able, and willing, immediately to accept any suitable work. '25 Fourth,
the individual must avoid disqualification from benefits under the statu-
tory provisions that, among other things, deny benefits to claimants who
voluntarily quit work,26 are fired for misconduct,27 or are on strike. 28
Under this statutory scheme, a woman who works steadily at a part-
time job, say for twenty hours per week, easily will meet the first require-
ment of having worked and paid into the system for the equivalent of
seventeen full-time work weeks. Upon becoming unemployed, however,
she will not qualify for benefits if she plans to continue working part-time
and limits her job search to such work. This is because the Employment
Security Department has interpreted Revised Code of Washington sec-
tion 50.20.010(3), the statute requiring a claimant to be available for
work, to mean that a claimant must be available for full-time work.29
23. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 50.04.030 (West 1990).
24. IdL § 50.04.310. The definition states:
An individual shall be deemed to be "unemployed" in any week during which the
individual performs no services and with respect to which no remuneration is payable
to the individual, or in any week of less than full time work, if the remuneration
payable to the individual with respect to such week is less than one and one-third
times the individual's weekly benefit amount plus five dollars.
Id
25. Id. § 50.20.010(3).
26. Id. § 50.20.050.
27. Id § 50.20.060.
28. Id. § 50.20.090.
29. In re Hogan, Comm'r Dec. (Ist) No. 951, at 1711 (Wash. Empl. See. Dep't Jan. 22,
The Department claims that by restricting her availability to part-time
work, the worker materially and impermissibly restricts her availability
for employment.30
The Department also considers domestic responsibilities an imper-
missible reason for the part-time worker to restrict her availability for
employment. Although the statute does not explicitly state that a worker
may not limit work availability based on her responsibilities at home,
such a position is implicit in section 50.20.050, which provides that do-
mestic responsibilities do not constitute good cause for voluntarily leav-
ing employment. 31
B. The Full-Time Work Requirement: Differential Impact on Women
The Clinic's opportunity to challenge these restrictions began, of
course, with a client:32 Ms. H. A single parent of a special needs child,
Ms. H had worked part-time as an assembly line piece-worker maling
buttons used for political campaigns. The workload fluctuated and dur-
ing a slow period before the December holidays, Ms. H's hours were
reduced by more than a third. She continued working these reduced
1973) (denying benefits to medical technologist who was available only for part-time or tempo-
rary employment because, since the majority of medical technologists work forty hours per
week, claimant was not willing to accept "any suitable employment").
30. Similarly, the Employment Security Department will deny benefits to a woman who
has child-care responsibilities that prevent her from working a swing or graveyard shift in the
evening or nighttime. The Department will consider these responsibilities a material and im-
permissible restriction on her availability for work. In re Yeoman, Comm'r Dec. (lst) No.
1200, at 2255 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't Dec. 24, 1974) (denying benefits to claimant who lim-
ited her job search to exclude the graveyard or late evening shift because she needed to care for
her ten-year-old son and alternative caretakers were unavailable; facts suggest that claimant
may have quit prior job to escape an abusive husband); In re Wright, Comm'r Dec. (Ist) No.
1173, at 2201 (Wash. Empl. See. Dep't Oct. 21, 1974) (denying benefits to woman who was
unwilling to work afternoon and evening shift as cook, due to husband's disapproval and im-
pact on her relationship with her daughters).
31. A person who leaves employment for this reason, however, is subject to a less onerous
disqualification provision than one who leaves for other reasons. Section 50.20.050(4) provides
that a person who leaves work for domestic reasons is disqualified for ten weeks or until she
earns wages equivalent to the weekly benefit amount for five weeks. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 50.20.050(4) (West 1990). An individual disqualified for misconduct may requalify only by
meeting the five weeks of earnings requirement. Id. § 50.20.060(1).
32. Before we encountered Ms. H, the Director of the Unemployment Law Project had
already mentioned that the Washington Employment Security Department was interpreting its
statutes to disqualify unemployed workers who were not available for all shifts. We were
aware that the Washington unemployment compensation system did not provide benefits for
workers whose availability for work might be subject to restrictions, and we had already han-
dled a hearing for Mr. T, a male student who wanted to work as a waiter at night. Having
litigated cases raising feminist issues, and having taught a course on feminist theory, I was
particularly interested in the implications of those restrictions for women.
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hours, but applied for unemployment compensation benefits and began
looking for other, more stable, part-time employment. During the pro-
cess of applying for unemployment benefits, Ms. H explained to the Em-
ployment Security Department that she was not seeking full-time
employment and was not available to work full-time. As justification for
this decision, Ms. H referred to pending judicial proceedings concerning
residential care33 of her son, in which a Family Law Commissioner had
suggested that the son's needs could not be met adequately if the parents
were both working full-time. The Department denied Ms. H's applica-
tion for benefits on the ground that she was not "available for work."
The two Clinic interns initially assigned to the case began their chal-
lenge to the full-time work requirement by pursuing the feminist insight
that the law often works a differential, negative impact on women. The
students quickly gathered data to support our (fairly obvious) intuition
that such a process was at work here.
That research demonstrated that the Department's full-time work
requirement has a differential, negative impact on women for three re-
lated reasons. First, women continue to bear significantly greater domes-
tic responsibilities than men for both child-care and caring for elderly
relatives. 34 Second, as a consequence of their greater domestic responsi-
bilities, far more women than men work part-time.35 Third, part-time
workers fare significantly worse financially than full-time workers. 36 The
availability of part-time employment has increased primarily in the lower
paying sectors that traditionally hire women.37 Part-time workers also
suffer higher levels of involuntary unemployment.38
Because women currently are more likely to work part-time and to
need to work part-time, a policy that disqualifies part-time workers from
receiving unemployment compensation benefits unless they are available
for full-time work disadvantages women. And that disproportionate ef-
33. The Washington legislature has rejected the conventional custody/visitation termi-
nology for proceedings involving parental access to their children in favor of the phrase "resi-
dential time" and a procedure involving the preparation of "parenting plans." WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.181-26.09.187 (West 1990).
34. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
35. Women make up approximately 41% of the total work force, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, VOL. 38 EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, tbl. A-9, at 26
(1991), but women hold 67% of the part-time jobs, id tbls. A-9, A-30, A-31, at 26, 43-44.
Approximately 18% of all jobs are part-time. Id
36. Diana M. Pearce, Toil and Trouble: Women Workers and Unemployment Compensa-
tion, 11 SIGNS 439, 447 (1985).
37. Id at 444-45.
38. Id. at 447.
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fect magnifies the disadvantages inherent in a context in which women
earn lower wages than men, 39 have a lower standard of living than men
after divorce,40 and make up a disproportionate percentage of the Ameri-
can poor.41
IH. Feminist Theory and the Full-Time Work Reqirement:
Unmasking the Male Norm
Recognizing and demonstrating that the Department's "full-time work"
requirement differentially affects women was not too difficult. The next
step-challenging the Department's anticipated defense of the require-
ment-was not as easy. That step required recognizing and unmasking
the male norm underlying the unemployment compensation statutes.
The Department's argument-that a claimant who seeks only part-
time employment materially limits her availability for work-initially
seems well-founded. The policy is not based on an explicitly gender-
based classification,4 2 and it seems justified by the ways in which part-
time workers differ from full-time workers. A worker who is available
only for part-time work presumably decreases the pool of jobs for which
he or she might qualify, and consequently increases the likelihood of ex-
tended unemployment.
One could argue, however, that the old saw applies here: What's
good for the goose is good for the gander. If the part-time worker must
be available for full-time work in order to increase the pool of jobs for
which she will qualify, why not apply the same analysis to full-time
workers? Full-time workers would also have more job opportunities if
they were required to be available for part-time work. I suspect most
readers would view such a requirement as ridiculous, and, indeed, the
39. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. 111, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, MEDIAN EARNINGS OF WORKERS BY WORK EXPERIENCE
AND SEX: 1977, at 415 (1991); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Wo-
men, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1179-80 (1988) (citing statistics). Compare Gene Koretz, Eco-
nomic Trends, Bus. WK., Dec. 24, 1990, at 14 (economist June O'Neil's work indicates a
sudden marked narrowing of the wage gap between women and men), with SUSAN FALUDI,
BACKLASH: THE WAR ON AMERICAN WOMEN 363-65 (1990) (critiquing claims that the wage
gap has narrowed).
40. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 337-40, 355-56 (1985).
41. GREG J. DUNCAN, YEARS OF POVERTY, YEARS OF PLENTY 48-52 (1984); Diana
Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work; and Welfare, 11 URB. & SOC. CHANGE
REv. 28, 28 (1978).
42. As a doctrinal matter, gender based classifications are potentially subject to challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause, but a challenge to a facially neutral classification must
show intentional discrimination, not simply discriminatory impact. Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
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Department does not extend this apparently logical requirement to the
would-be full-time worker. Such workers are permitted to look only for
full-time work. Why?
Underlying the Department's full-time requirement is a classic, un-
stated male norm: that of the male "head-of-household," whose primary
domestic responsibility consists of providing economic support to a wife
and children. The unemployment compensation system was enacted in
response to unprecedented levels of unemployment among such males
during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 43 As "primary wage earners"
with wives at home to handle the domestic responsibilities, those men
wanted and needed full-time work.
In Washington, the need of the male norm worker for full-time
work is implicitly accommodated under the availability requirement of
Revised Code of Washington section 50.20.010(3). 44 Under that statute
claimants are required only to be available to accept "suitable" work. In
practice, however, a worker seeking full-time work is not required also to
seek part-time work. Though never articulated, the logic is apparently as
follows: The typical full-time worker (male or female) requires full-time
work for self-support and, often, to support additional family members.
Part-time work will not be sufficient to pay the bills, or at least will be
insufficient to support the desired lifestyle. For such workers, therefore,
part-time work does not constitute "suitable" work because it conflicts
with their economic needs.45
Yet the need for full-time work can be conceptualized as a "domes-
tic" need or responsibility, as well as an "economic" need. The tradi-
tional family responsibilities of women are viewed as "domestic," and the
corresponding family responsibilities of men as "economic," because of a
"separate spheres" ideology and practice in the white middle class during
43. Or, more precisely, the system responded to unemployment among white males. Un-
employment among other men, especially blacks, has been approximately double that of white
males going back at least to 1948. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, series D 87-101, at 135 (1976). The experience of the past
several decades suggests that extraordinary levels of unemployment among black males does
not necessarily generate a significant governmental response.
44. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. I say "implicitly" because, as with most
male norms, the issue is never raised. To my knowledge, no statute, regulation, or case states
that a worker must seek only full-time work, and not part-time work. This requirement is
simply one of the background assumptions of the unemployment compensation program.
45. Another unstated norm, of course, underlies the assumption that full-time work is
required to accommodate the economic needs of the male-norm worker. That norm, derived
from the U.S. standard of living, arises from our assumptions about how much money is
"needed" to support a family.
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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 46 The separate spheres ide-
ology allocates the world of work to males and the world of family and
home to females.47 Once we recognize that the male norm worker's need
for full-time work is a domestic need and that the unemployment com-
pensation statute implicitly accommodates that domestic need, we can
make a similar "suitability" argument on behalf of part-time workers.
For workers who have heavy child-care, elder-care, or other domestic
responsibilities, 48 full-time work is not suitable work because it conflicts
with their need to satisfy domestic obligations.
The ultimate question is not whether workers seeking only full-time,
or only part-time, work limit their availability for work. Of course they
do. Nor is the question whether male norm workers seeking only full-
time work and part-time workers with child-care duties limit their availa-
bility for employment based on "domestic responsibilities." Clearly they
do. Rather, within the framework of the unemployment compensation
system, 49 the question is whether such limitations should place the work-
ers beyond the purview of the unemployment compensation system-a
system that provides benefits only to individuals who are genuinely at-
tached to the labor market. Within that framework, it makes sense to
require that a worker be available for a wide enough range of job open-
ings that she has a reasonable chance of obtaining a job. Such a require-
ment, however, need not encompass a full-time work rule.50
IV. So Where Does That Get Us?
Applying the insights of feminist theory provided an opportunity for
a classic "Aha!" reaction. The feminist insight that unstated male norms
46. CAROL HYMOWITZ & MICHAELE WEISSMAN, A HIsToRY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA
64-75 (1978); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
47. Wives might be expected to work to support themselves, which is happening to a
significant extent in this culture. Even children might be expected to work at a much younger
age than is common today. I make this observation not as a normative point, but merely to
support the claim that the male norm worker's need for full-time work should not be charac-
terized as economic, while the woman's need for part-time work is treated as domestic.
48. For simplicity's sake, I will refer only to child-care responsibilities for the remainder
of the discussion.
49. The basic framework of the unemployment compensation system can itself be chal-
lenged as failing to accommodate the needs of many women. See Law, Women, Work, Wel-
fare, supra note 19, at 1282-318; Pearce, supra note 36, at 447.
50. An unemployed worker will be more likely to find employment if the number of jobs
available equals or exceeds the number of applicants. Depending on the state of the economy,
the pool of unfilled jobs in either the full-time or part-time category may be either great or
limited. The fact that a worker limits a job search to either category of jobs does not by itself
say anything about the worker's chances of employment.
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often underlie statutes that disadvantage women allowed us to say, "Hey,
I see what's going on here," by providing a conceptual framework for
recognizing and naming the way the unemployment compensation stat-
ute operates. From this understanding, we could then develop a tradi-
tional combination of statutory and constitutional arguments. Our
primary contention was that the existing statute could be interpreted to
authorize benefits for individuals who were seeking part-time work. We
hoped to make that argument more palatable by highlighting constitu-
tional problems with the Department's "full-time work" rule.51 Given
developments in constitutional equal protection doctrine, an effort to
mount a federal challenge to the state statute would have been problem-
atic because we were forced to rely on the statute's differential impact on
women.52 Fortunately, Washington state law, although unsettled on this
point, leaves room for argument. 53
As it happened, Ms. H won the first round of her case. But she did
not win because the challenge outlined above was successful. Instead,
and ironically, Ms. H benefited from a special statutory provision that is
apparently targeted at one group of male norm workers-hourly paid
individuals in industries subject to seasonal reductions in available work.
The Washington statute provides that an individual is considered unem-
ployed if working less than full-time and earning less than the payable
weekly unemployment compensation benefit amount.5 4 Department reg-
ulations permit such "partially unemployed individuals" to collect unem-
ployment compensation benefits without requiring them to be
51. Federal law does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in the operation of
federally funded programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Nor do any Department of Labor
regulations contain such a general prohibition. Thus, there appears to be no basis for challeng-
ing the state full-time work rule on the ground that it is inconsistent with nonconstitutional
federal law.
52. In order to make out a federal constitutional equal protection claim, a plaintiff must
show intentionally disparate treatment; disparate impact is not sufficient. Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976); Austin v. Berryman, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 951 (4th Cir.
Jan. 28, 1992) (upholding provision of Virginia unemployment compensation statute against
federal equal protection challenge based on disparate impact on women). Because no statutory
prohibition against discrimination applies here, see supra note 51, we were not directly con-
cerned with the extent to which the Supreme Court had undermined the availability of the
disparate impact analysis in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-58 (1989), actions subsequently modified by
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1990.
53. The state courts remain free to adopt a disparate impact analysis under state constitu-
tional provisions. This course is by no means foreclosed under Washington case law. See
Macias v. Dep't Labor & Indus., 100 Wash. 2d 263, 269, 668 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1983); Hanson
v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d. 195, 202, 517 P.2d 599, 604 (1973).
54. See supra note 24.
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"available" for other work.55 Although the statute and regulations are
not targeted at individuals who were employed part-time prior to a re-
duction in hours, they do not exclude such persons. Thus, because Ms.
H was still employed part-time, she was eligible for benefits.
Ms. H's saga did not end there, however. Her employers were angry
at her receipt of benefits and demanded that Ms. H quit or agree that she
would not apply for unemployment benefits while she worked for their
firm. She refused their condition. Now out of work, she again applied
for unemployment compensation benefits. Predictably, she became em-
broiled in another hearing that considered both whether she voluntarily
quit or was fired, and whether she was "available for work" given her
restriction to part-time employment. The employer defaulted and an
Administrative Law Judge ruled that full-time work did not constitute
"suitable work" for Ms. H.56
Apart from the result in Ms. H's case, the broader problem is likely
to remain, and we will face the choice of whether to pursue litigation,
administrative change, a legislative strategy, or perhaps all of the above.
In any event, the insights of feminist jurisprudence remain and may af-
fect future cases.
Conclusion
Attorneys often discount legal theory as abstract and irrelevant to
the practice of law, and indeed it can be. Good theory, however, has
intrinsic, inspirational, and instrumental value. Thus, as illustrated by
Ms. H's case, successful theory not only can help develop new categories
and new strategies for thinking about old problems, but it also can help
us recognize that "the way things are" is neither natural, necessary, nor
in some cases desirable.
55. Section 192-12-150(4) provides that "A partially unemployed applicant for benefits
who is attached to a regular job shall not be required to register for work in any week with
respect to which he is partially unemployed.... ." WAsH. ADM. CODE § 192.12.150(4) (Vest
1990).
56. The Administrative Law Judge noted the line of decisions of the Employment Secur-
ity Department Commission that disqualify claimants who restrict their eligibility for work
because of childcare needs, e.g., In re Yeoman, Comm'r Dec. (1st) No. 1200, at 2255 (Wash.
Empl. Sec. Dep't Dec. 24, 1974), but found Ms. H's situation more analogous to that of a
claimant who is unable to work more than five hours a day because of physical incapacity, In
re Ashe, Comm'r Dec. (2d) No. 161, at 147 (Wash. Empl. Sec. Dep't Apr. 16, 1976).
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